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This paper aims to test whether the use of contraries can facilitate spatial problem
solving. Specifically, we examined whether a training session which included explicit
guidance on thinking in contraries would improve problem solving abilities. In our study,
the participants in the experimental condition were exposed to a brief training session
before being presented with seven visuo-spatial problems to solve. During training it
was suggested that it would help them to find the solution to the problems if they
systematically transformed the spatial features of each problem into their contraries.
Their performance was compared to that of a control group (who had no training). Two
participation conditions were considered: small groups and individuals. Higher success
rates were found in the groups exposed to training as compared to the individuals (in
both the training and no training conditions), even though the time required to find
a solution was longer. In general, participants made more attempts (i.e., drawings)
when participating in groups than individually. The number of drawings done while the
participants were trying to solve the problems did not increase after training. In order
to explore if the quality (if not the number) of drawings was modified, we sampled one
problem out of the seven we had used in the experiment (the “pigs in a pen” problem)
and examined the drawings in detail. Differences between the training and no training
conditions emerged in terms of properties focused on and transformed in the drawings.
Based on these results, in the final discussion possible explanations are suggested as to
why training had positive effects specifically in the group condition.
Keywords: insight, problem solving, contrast class, heuristics, contraries, spatial properties
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we explore the impact of explicitly guiding people to think in contraries when
searching for solutions to visuo-spatial insight problems (examples of this kind of problem are
provided in Table 1). We held a training session during which participants in the experiment were
provided with demonstrations of how manipulating the representation of a problem in terms of
contraries might be helpful. They were then asked to apply this “way of thinking” in a test phase
where they were presented with other visuo-spatial problems. The aim of the experiment was to
investigate the effects of specific hints or training on insight problem solving. The impact of general
meta-cognitive training on performance has been addressed in previous literature (e.g., Walinga
et al., 2011; Patrick and Ahmed, 2014; Patrick et al., 2015), as has the impact of more specific
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hints which have been customized to the contents of a specific
problem (e.g., Chronicle et al., 2001, Experiment 3; Weisberg
and Alba, 1981; Grant and Spivey, 2003; Kershaw and Ohlsson,
2004; Kershaw et al., 2013; Öllinger et al., 2013, 2014). What we
aimed to focus on here, and to further test based on the results
of the experiment, was the hypothesis that thinking in contraries
might support transformations in the mental representation of a
problem, as required by insight problem solving. Clear evidence
of this has yet to be provided, but there are some precursors
to the present study which suggest that the question is worth
investigating. We will briefly revise these in the next section,
contextualizing the underlying processing in terms of special-
process and business-as-usual perspectives.
Contrariety: A Radical Change while
Maintaining Continuity
In the special process theory, insight is conceived of as a process
arising from a sudden restructuring of the representation of
a problem occurring at an unconscious level (Siegler, 2000;
Kershaw and Ohlsson, 2004; Bowden et al., 2005; Murray and
Byrne, 2013). From this point of view, insight is a discontinuous
process since it implies a break with previous constraints and
attempts. On the other hand, in the business-as-usual theory,
insight is seen as a continuous, step by step, conscious process
which is similar in nature to the processes underlying the solving
of non-insight problems (Newell and Simon, 1972; MacGregor
et al., 2001; Chronicle et al., 2004; Ormerod et al., 2013).
An integrated perspective has also been put forward based on
the argument that the two alternative views are not mutually
exclusive and that they both contribute to insight although
perhaps in different ways and/or at different moments (Fleck and
Weisberg, 2013; Weisberg, 2015).
Using contraries as a strategy in problem solving seems
to necessitate an integrated process of this type. Breaking
things up into perceptual chunks and reorganizing them into
opposite patterns means producing a radical change (i.e., a
sharp discontinuity). However, at the same time this change
is data-driven, that is, it is anchored on and driven by the
inherent features of whatever is represented and in this sense
the process implied is gradual. For instance, in Gale and Ball’s
studies (2003, 2006, 2009, 2012) on people’s thought processes
during hypothesis testing in Wason’s (1960) 2-4-6 rule discovery
task, the participants’ performance improved when they were
given a contrast class cue. In the original form of the task
associated with Wason’s rule, participants are asked to discover
the rule (known only to the experimenter) that in this case
governs the production of series of three numbers. The rule
is “any ascending sequence.” Participants are then given 2-4-
6 as a seed triple and are asked to generate further series of
three number, which are then assessed by the experimenter as
either conforming or not conforming to the target rule. When
the participants are confident, they announce that they have
discovered the rule. In their studies, Gale and Ball (2003, 2006,
2009, 2012) used a dual-goal variant of this task, in which
participants are asked to discover two complementary rules,
one labeled “DAX” (i.e., the standard “ascending numbers”
rule) and the other labeled “MED” (i.e., “any other triples”).
The aim was to test whether providing “contrast class cues”
for the MED rule might facilitate participants’ performance.
They provided the participants with different types of contrast
class cues as MED exemplars (see in particular Gale and Ball,
2012). One of these was the 6-4-2 triple, that contrasted with
the original 2-4-6 triple on a salient and crucial dimension,
i.e. an “ascending” series versus a “descending” series. The
other exemplar series, i.e., 4-4-4 and 9-8-1, contrasted with the
original series of numbers in terms of dimensions which were
irrelevant to the task. Namely, 4-4-4 contrasts with 2-4-6 on
the “same-different” dimension (i.e., “three identical numbers”
versus “three different numbers”) while 9-8-1 contrasts with 2-
4-6 on the “mixed-homogeneous” dimension (i.e., “mixed odd
and even numbers” vs. “only even numbers”), as well as on the
dimensions relating to “equal-unequal” intervals and whether
the middle number “is-is not” the arithmetic mean of the two
numbers which flank it. Participants who had been presented
with examples of series of three ascending versus descending
numbers recognized the oppositional nature of the two rules
implied, explored fewer confirmatory alternatives and more
frequently found the solution suggesting that contrasts play a
facilitatory role. As a result of the evident contrast between
the ascending and descending series of numbers, the thought
process that was then triggered apparently focused on a marked
discontinuity. However, at the same time, the cue also prompted
the recognition of a straightforward relationship connecting
the two example series suggesting that a continuous thought
process was involved here too. In addition, a continuous, step
by step process was suggested by the participants’ tendency to
generate from time to time hypotheses that varied along just one
dimension. This latter feature is in agreement with hypothesis
testing in general, as conceived by Oaksford and Charter in their
iterative counterfactual model (1994).
The fact that there is a clear and straightforward relationship
linking two “contrast classes” is part of the definition of this
psychological construct (see how “contrast class” is defined
by Oaksford and Stenning, 1992; Oaksford, 2002). More in
general, the characterization of contrast/contrariety/opposition
in terms of maximum distance with at the same time a high
degree of affinity is a common feature in research in the fields
of both Psycholinguistics and Experimental Psychology. In the
areas of Cognitive Semantics and Linguistics, opposites refer
to the extremes of an underlying dimension (e.g., Lehrer and
Lehrer, 1982; Cruse, 1986; Jones et al., 2012). Antonyms are
at the same time minimally and maximally different from one
another. They are associated with the same conceptual domain,
but they denote opposite poles or parts of that domain (Cruse,
1986; Paradis, 1997, 2001; Murphy, 2003, pp. 43–45; Willners,
2001; Croft and Cruse, 2004, pp. 164–192; Paradis et al., 2009).
These two features (maximum distance and invariance) also
characterize contrariety/opposition from a perceptual point of
view. Various studies on the perception of this relationship in
a number of different types of visual configuration have shown
that a necessary condition for two events under observation to
be perceived as contrary is that a maximum transformation of a
salient feature (which in these studies was usually orientation)
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is manifested among overall invariant configurations. This has
been formalized in the perceptual principles of non additivity and
invariance in Bianchi and Savardi (2006; 2008a; see also Bianchi
and Savardi, 2008b,c; Savardi et al., 2010; Bianchi et al., 2014).
The duality that thinking in terms of contraries seems
to imply (i.e., maximum variation in an overall invariant
configuration, extremes of a common underlying dimension
and discontinuity in a clearly continuous pattern) also emerges
when we consider negation and counterfactual thinking. In
natural language and reasoning, humans tend to use negation
in precise ways, following cognitive rules. One of the roles of
negation is that of being a modifier of degree. This happens,
for instance, when we say that “the water is not hot” about
water that may be warm, lukewarm or cool (Bolinger, 1972;
Horn and Kato, 2000; Israel, 2001; Giora et al., 2005a,b).
Negation presupposes a polar dimension along which a shift
away from the adjective to which not is applied occurs (Kaup
et al., 2006, 2007; Paradis and Willners, 2006; Fraenkel and
Schul, 2008; Bianchi et al., 2011c). Negated propositions are
assumed to evoke two contrasting spaces, a factual and a
counterfactual space (Langacker, 1991; Fauconnier and Turner,
2002; Hasson and Glucksberg, 2006). Counterfactual thinking
requires a capacity to imagine alternatives to events, actions
or states in order to test and validate hypotheses (Roese,
1997; Byrne, 2005). Counterfactual strategies are employed
in falsification processes which are central to inductive
and deductive reasoning (Wason, 1960, 1966, 1968; Farris
and Revlin, 1989; Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Evans, 2002;
Augustinova et al., 2005; Augustinova, 2008). In this case
both confirmatory hypotheses and disconfirmatory hypotheses
(that according to Wason’s definition, 1960, literally contradict
the previous ones) are generated. Counterfactual thinking is
also implied in decision making. Inducing participants to take
into account possibilities which are diametrically opposite to
their initial assumptions is a de-biasing strategy which allows
them to contrast the tendency to not consider adequately
those alternatives which are at odds with their beliefs and
perceptions and this leads to more accurate decisions (Lord
et al., 1984; Mussweiler et al., 2000). The ability to imagine
contrasting alternatives is also related to creativity and analytical
problem solving. Additive counterfactuals, i.e. the addition
of different antecedent elements to reconstruct reality (Roese
and Olson, 1993), enhance performance in creative generation
tasks that are facilitated by an expansive processing style,
whereas subtractive counterfactuals, i.e., removing antecedent
elements to reconstruct reality (Roese and Olson, 1993),
enhance performance in analytical problem solving tasks that
are facilitated by a relational process style (Markman et al.,
2007).
The idea that both discontinuity and continuity are involved
in the re-organization which takes place in insight problem
solving was somehow prefigured by Gestalt psychologists. They
did not explicitly discuss it in terms of contrariety/contrast, but
in a sense they paved the way toward the hypothesis put forward
in this paper, i.e., that contraries support the representational
change that is required for an insight problem to be solved. As
Wertheimer (1945) was the first to point out, a solution process
requires problem solvers to reorganize the phenomenological
features of the problem and this apparently occurs as a sudden
“aha” moment. But it is less often remembered that Wertheimer
also explicitly specified that this reorganization is based on
the requirements of the initial phenomenological structure of
the problem and is as such guided by them (representing the
continuity element). According to him, the key operations in
this reorganization are dividing elements that are unified and
unifying elements that are separated while transforming their
orientation and position in space [see Wertheimer’s classic
parallelogram problem, reported in Appendix 1 (Supplementary
Material)]. From Duncker’s perspective too (Duncker, 1945),
productive thinking implies creating a break with the original
formulation and representation of the problem and the usual
way of thinking and using its inherent features in an unusual,
sometimes even contrary way (representing the discontinuity
element). In line with Wertheimer, he also explicitly stated that
the solution process is suggested by and guided along directions
emerging from the original structure of the problem.
If one adds to Wertheimer’s and Duncker’s premises the
evidence that the human direct experience of space is grounded
on oppositional structures which mostly refer to the human body
(e.g., Howard and Templeton, 1966; Golledge, 1992; Shelton
and McNamara, 1997; Tversky and Hard, 2009) such as near-
far, high-low, vertical-horizontal, in front of-behind, above-
below, left-right, etc. (Savardi and Bianchi, 2009; Bianchi et al.,
2011a,b, 2013), one can see first of all why contraries support the
transformation of a problem’s spatial representation and foster
its reorganization and secondly why they do so while remaining
anchored to the structure of the problem (this has been partially
discussed in Branchini et al., 2009, 2015b).
Aware vs. Unaware Processes
One of the factors implied in business-as-usual versus
special-process perspectives concerns the consciousness vs.
unconsciousness of the underlying thought processes in problem
solving. This is one of the basic dichotomies characterizing
thinking and reasoning processes even beyond problem solving,
as acknowledged in dual-process theories (for an updated review
of this see Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Weisberg, 2015).
The issue is also discussed in the literature investigating the
effects of hints or training in problem solving. In most of these
studies the hints provided by the experimenters which aim to
bring to the fore the critical feature of the problem consist
of implicit suggestions to problem solvers. For example, the
solution to Duncker’s radiation problem speaks of multiple low-
intensity lasers being directed from several angles tissue rather
than concentrating them onto a limited area (and thus risking
damage to the skin in that area). In Grant and Spivey’s study
(2003) the hint came from an animation of the whole oval
perimeter representing the skin. In Bröderbauer et al.’s study
(2013) on Katona’s five square problem, the hint provided to
participants in the experiment consisted of a “wave form” (the
shape represented in the solution) hidden in the logo of the
research group (Bröderbauer et al., 2013). In Öllinger et al.’s study
(2013) on the eight-coin problem, the implicit suggestion to use
the third dimension to find the solution was provided by a variety
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of different initial configurations of the eight-coin problem (some
of which cued the use of the third dimension).
Conversely, training tends to work on an explicit level because
the aim is to make participants aware of how to solve a specific
set of problems. For example, Dow and Mayer (2004) developed
four different training programs (i.e., a verbal insight problem
training packet, a mathematical insight problem packet, a spatial
insight problem training packet and a combined verbal and
spatial insight problem training packet). Each of these included
information about the critical features of the specific set of
problems and a description of the three-step procedure to be
followed in order to solve that particular type of problem. Patrick
and Ahmed (2014) and Patrick et al. (2015) developed various
training programs in which participants were informed about the
nature of verbal insight problems and were then instructed to use
a specific procedure to solve that specific type of insight problem.
The study presented in this paper represents a conceptual
development of a previous study (Branchini et al., 2015a). In
that study participants working in small groups were given
implicit guidance during the search phase in order to help
them to analyze the spatial properties of the problems they
had been presented with in terms of contraries. Contraries
acted as an implicit heuristic since participants were only
“primed” to consider contraries in one experimental condition
and “prompted” with a vague hint in another condition. They
were not specifically told how or why doing this might help.
The suggestion led to shorter periods of time needed to find
the solution, increased success rates and it also modified the
kind of operations performed during the solution process: there
were more goal directed behaviors, more reformulations of the
problem and more operations directed toward a modification of
the visual structure of the problem (e.g., changing orientation
and localization, and reciprocal positioning of parts of the overall
structure). In Gale and Ball’s study too (2012), a contrast cue
(ascending vs. descending triples) acted on an implicit level. Why
the two exemplars should facilitate the discovery of the rules by
pointing to the salient dimension (ascending-descending) was
not made explicit to participants.
The study presented in this paper aimed to provide an
expanded analysis of the impact of contraries on visual-spatial
problem solving by foreseeing and testing the possibility that
contraries might have a beneficial effect when used as part
of a conscious and explicit strategy. If one keeps in mind
Öllinger et al. model of the phases characterizing problem solving
(Öllinger et al., 2008; but see also Ohlsson, 1992; Knoblich et al.,
1999, 2001), one could foresee contraries to be beneficial in three
different stages:
(1) In the initial problem representation (i.e., when a “biased”
problem representation is established which makes it very
difficult to access the operators that are necessary to
transform the problem state into a proper solution).
(2) As an intentional process during the search phase (i.e., when
an appropriate solution procedure might help the problem
solver not to get stuck in an impasse).
(3) As an unconscious process (during the impasse phase)
that enables the possibility that an unconscious change
in problem representation will reach the threshold of
awareness.
In this paper we do not put forward a hypothesis regarding
at which specific stage the effect of the training should come
into play. Prompting participants to think in terms of opposites
from the very beginning of the solution search phase, might
have an impact already at the level of the initial representation
formed in problem solver’s mind, but it might also have a
later effect and support representational changes following the
experiences of impasse, by suggesting the “new” starting point
to be considered in the new attempt (at this level it would act
as an intentional process). However, the preliminary training
might also activate an arousal toward oppositional thinking
operating also at an unconscious level during the impasse phases.
A different experimental design from that used in the present
study would be needed in order to answer the question of whether
the effect concerns exclusively one of these phases or all of them.
The aim of this study was to verify whether the training has an
effect or whether it has not.
THE PRESENT STUDY
In this study we explore whether explicit training aimed at
increasing the awareness of a heuristic based on contraries has a
positive effect on the reasoning processes related to visuo-spatial
insight problems. A brief training program was developed which
demonstrated that the systematic manipulation of the features
relating to a problem (in this case transforming them into their
contraries) might facilitate the search for a solution. We focused
on problem solving in a group setting (with groups of three
people) since a previous study which demonstrated the positive
effects of providing implicit guidance to use opposites in problem
solving (Branchini et al., 2015a) was conducted with groups. It is
also well known from previous literature that problem solving in
groups does not necessarily follow the same path as individual
problem solving (for a review, see for example Laughlin et al.,
2006). Although ourmain interest was in the group condition, we
also added an individual condition in order to have a comparative
indication of the effect of training in this latter case.
We tested the effects of the training in terms of success rates,
the time needed to find the solution and the number of attempts
made in the search phase. Each drawing done by the participants
in the search phase was considered an attempt to find a solution.
In order to further tap into the ways in which training influenced
the thought processes of the participants, we also studied the
spatial characteristics of the drawings done by the groups for one
of the seven problems we had given them to solve. We randomly
selected the “pigs in a pen” problem. The decision was made
to analyze the drawings (as a dependent variable) rather than
the discussions between the participants since drawings can be
regarded as behavioral correlates of the cognitive search space
and as such reveal participants’ aware and unaware cognitive
processes (see Fedor et al., 2015). Moreover, drawings are often
the best way to share thoughts when people work together in a
group.
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Specifically, we aimed to explore whether the training
impacted on their performance in terms of:
(1) The number of problems successfully solved.
(2) The time needed to find the correct solution.
(3) The number of attempts made.
Moreover, by means of an in-depth analysis of the drawings done
by the participants working in groups while trying to solve the
“pigs in a pen” problem, we aimed to gain an insight into how the
training impacted on:
(4) The set of properties explored in the drawings (which we take
as a indication of the search space): did participants in the
training condition focus on a broader set of properties?
(5) Whether both poles of the dimension concerned were
explored (the search space in terms of dimensions): did
participants in the training condition explore one property
and its contrary more often than those in the baseline
condition?
(6) The degree of changeability/fixedness of the properties
relating to the problem: were participants in the training
condition more inclined to abandon or change a property
instead of keeping it fixed?
In order to help us to interpret the findings which had
emerged for the analyses of the drawings in the group
condition, a comparative analysis of the dimensions manipulated
by participants in the individual (baseline versus training)
conditions was also conducted.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One hundred and thirty-six participants (46 male, 90 female,
M = 25.74 years, SD = 2.45 years) took part in the experiment
individually (62 in the baseline condition and 74 in the training
condition) during university classes on topics not related to
the study. Another one hundred and twenty participants (33
male, 87 female, M = 21.73 years, SD = 2.19 years) took part
in the experiment in groups of three. They were divided in
forty inter-observational groups (20 groups, i.e., 60 participants,
in the baseline condition and 20 groups, i.e., 60 participants,
in the training condition). All of the participants gave written
informed consent to participate in the study and they were
undergraduate students at the University of Verona. The study
was approved by the ethical committee of the Department
of Human Sciences of the University of Verona (Italy) and
conforms to the ethical principles of the declaration of Helsinki
(World Medical Association, 2013).
Materials/Problems
Seven spatial geometrical problems were used in all conditions
(see Table 1). The order of the seven problems was randomized
between participants.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two Participation conditions
(individually vs. in groups) and two Training conditions (the
training condition vs. the no-training condition or baseline).
TABLE 1 | The seven problems used in the study.
Formulation Figure
Pigs in a pen (Schooler et al., 1993; Ball et al.,
2015): participants are asked to construct two more
square pens so as to ensure that each pig ends up
in a pen of its own.
Triangle (De Bono, 1969; Schooler et al., 1993):
participants are asked to make the triangle shape
point downwards by moving only three circles.
Deer (Origin unknown): participants are asked to
make the deer face in a different direction by moving
just one of the lines.
Eight-coin (Ormerod et al., 2002; Öllinger et al.,
2013): participants are asked to move two coins in
such a way that each coin only touches three
other coins.
Five-square (Katona, 1940): participants are asked
to reduce the number of squares from five to four by
moving only three sticks.
Square (Kanizsa, 1973): participants are asked to
build a square by putting together six smaller
figures: four right - angled isosceles triangles and
two right - angled trapezoids of equal height but
with bases of different lengths.
Circumference (Köhler, 1969): participants are
asked to find the length of the oblique side CD,
given the length of the diameter AB.
In the baseline condition, participants were presented with
seven spatial geometrical problems and were asked to find a
solution. In the training condition, participants attended a brief
training session (duration: 10 min) before being shown the
problems. During the training session, one of the experimenters
explained how a strategy based on the manipulation of contraries
could help with spatial geometrical problems. This was done
by showing how three spatial geometrical problems—i.e.,
the “parallelogram” problem (Wertheimer, 1945), the “nine-
dot” problem (Maier, 1930) and the “altar-window” problem
(Wertheimer, 1945)—could be solved by applying this strategy
(to understand precisely what “changing a property into its
contrary” means in relation to the three example problems
we refer to, see Appendix 1 in Supplementary material). The
participants were then requested to apply the strategy to seven
new problems (see Table 1). They were specifically invited to
identify and list all the spatial features which characterized the
problem and then transform them into their contraries (the first
step) before embarking on the search for a solution (the second
step). Before being given the seven problems, the participants
were requested to rate on a 0–10 point scale how well they had
understood the training and to what extent they considered it to
be useful.
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In all the conditions, participants were provided with pens
and sheets of paper to use for drawings or notes. They were
given seven and a half minutes for each problem1. When they
thought they had found the solution, they were instructed
to raise their hands. The experimenters took note of their
response time before ascertaining whether the solution was
correct or not. If it was, the response time was recorded, if not,
they were encouraged to keep searching. All the sessions were
video-recorded.
RESULTS
There are two points regarding methodology which need to
be noted before the discussion of the results. First, the survey
carried out after the training session showed that the participants
exposed to training reported that they felt they had understood
it (mean rating of understanding in both conditions: M =
7.4, SD = 1.67) and that they considered it to be potentially
useful (mean rating of predicted usefulness in both participation
conditions: M = 7.33, SD = 1.86). This confirms that the
participants had not only been exposed to training, but that they
had also taken it in.
Secondly, all the statistical analyses presented in the following
sections were carried out using Generalized Mixed Effect Models
(GLMM). This meant it was possible to deal with the variability
related to the Problems and the Subjects as random effects
while considering the two experimental conditions (Participation
condition and Training condition) as fixed effects. Random
effects have factor levels that do not exhaust the possibilities. If
one of the levels of a variable were replaced by another level,
the study would be essentially unchanged (Borenstein et al.,
2009). For the purposes of the hypotheses tested in our study,
the problems used in the experiment were simply exemplars of
a general category (i.e., visuo-spatial geometrical problems) and
they were interchangeable with any other problems of the same
type. They did not differ in terms of one or another feature that
we were interested in studying because we expected a systematic
interaction between it and the fixed effects manipulated in
the study; we chose these problems as random exemplars of
visuo-spatial problems of varying degrees of difficulty. According
to the item response theory (Baker, 2001), every item can be
described by two characteristics: item discrimination and item
difficulty. These express the relationship between a latent ability
(in our case insight problem solving ability) and the probability
of correct responses for an item (in our case, a problem). Since
our study aimed to test whether the experimental conditions
(Participation and Training) affected performance, one of the
minimum desirable conditions to start with was to use a set of
items (problems to solve) which were characterized by varying
degrees of difficulty ranging in probability from 0 to 1. As can be
seen inTable 2, the frequency of correct solutions associated with
each problem in effect varied across problems. It was particularly
high for some problems, particularly low for others and in
between for some others.
1Six to ten minutes have been used to test insight problem solving in a thinking
aloud condition, for example, in studies done by Ball et al. (2015), Schooler et al.
(1993) and Fleck and Weisberg (2013).
Success Rates
To begin with, we studied the effects on the success rate (i.e., the
number of correct responses over the total number of responses)
of the Training condition, i.e., training versus baseline, and the
Participation condition, i.e., individual versus group, using a
GLMM (binomial family, with Subjects and Problems as random
effects).
No significant main effect of the Training condition emerged
meaning that training did not lead per se to better results
independently of the Participation condition, i.e. in groups
or individually. A main effect of the Participation condition
emerged [χ2(1, N = 176) = 11.6301, p < 0.001], suggesting that
groups perform better than individuals. However, there was
a significant interaction between the Participation condition
and the Training condition [χ2(1, N = 176) = 3.673, p = 0.05;
see Figure 1] indicating that groups did not perform better
than individuals in the baseline condition (Bonferroni post-hoc
baseline-group vs. baseline-individual: EST = 0.407, SE = 0.389,
z ratio = 1.044, p = 1.000). Therefore, being part of a group did
not in itself guarantee a better success rate. Higher success rates
emerged exclusively when the groups were exposed to training:
their performance was significantly better than the performance
of the individual participants in the training condition (post-hoc
training-group vs. training-individual: EST = 1.452, SE = 0.384,
z ratio = 3.778, p < 0.001) and also the individual participants
in the baseline condition (post-hoc training-group vs. baseline-
individual: EST = 1.064, SE= 0.387, z ratio= 2.744, p < 0.05).
Time Needed to Find a Solution
A higher success rate did not necessarily mean that participants
were also faster. On the contrary, a GLMM carried out on
the time taken to reach the correct solution (Gaussian Family,
with Training condition and Participation condition as fixed
effects; Subjects and Problems as random effects) revealed that
it took the participants longer to find the correct solution in
the training condition than in the baseline condition [main
effect of Training condition: χ2(1, N = 176) = 6.144, p < 0.02;
see Figure 2]. This was independently of whether they were
working individually or in groups (i.e., no interaction between
the Training and Participation conditions emerged). In the
training condition they were asked to start by listing all the
opposite spatial properties they could identify in the structure of
the problem. As we considered this phase to already constitute
part of the analysis of the problem, in the experimental design
the time taken up for this analysis was included in the seven
and a half minutes they had at their disposal. The longer
solution times may thus be a consequence of them having spent
some time on this initial phase. In other words, training is
effective in terms of success rates but it is nonetheless time
consuming.
Number of Attempts, i.e., the Number of
Drawings Done
We analyzed the number of attempts made by each group
by means of a GLMM (Poisson family, with Frequency as
a dependent variable, Training condition and Participation
Condition as fixed effects, Subjects and Problems as random
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TABLE 2 | Success rate (i.e., the proportion of correct responses over the total number of responses) for the seven problems used in the study, in the
Training and Participation conditions.
Participation condition Training condition Problems Success rate Mean success rate
Group Baseline Deer 0.45 0.32
Group Baseline Circumference 0.2
Group Baseline Five-square 0.1
Group Baseline Pigs in a pen 0.5
Group Baseline Eight-coin 0.15
Group Baseline Square 0
Group Baseline Triangle 0.85
Group Training Deer 0.35 0.41
Group Training Circumference 0.5
Group Training Five-square 0.15
Group Training Pigs in a pen 0.75
Group Training Eight-coin 0.25
Group Training Square 0
Group Training Triangle 0.9
Individual Baseline Deer 0.23 0.28
Individual Baseline Circumference 0.24
Individual Baseline Five-square 0.18
Individual Baseline Pigs in a pen 0.53
Individual Baseline Eight-coin 0.1
Individual Baseline Square 0.02
Individual Baseline Triangle 0.63
Individual Training Deer 0.23 0.23
Individual Training Circumference 0.16
Individual Training Five-square 0.07
Individual Training Pigs in a pen 0.53
Individual Training Eight-coin 0.05
Individual Training Square 0
Individual Training Triangle 0.57
effects). There was a significant effect relating to the Participation
condition [χ2(1, N = 176) = 63.671, p < 0.0001]: in groups,
participants made more attempts than when participating
individually (Figure 3). There was no significant effect of the
Training condition and no interaction between the two fixed
effects thus indicating that training did not lead to a difference
in terms of the number of attempts. The analyses which were
conducted subsequently were in order to ascertain whether there
were any differences in the quality rather than the quantity of the
drawings.
Behavior during the Search for a Solution:
Spatial Features Manipulated in the
Drawings Done by the Groups When Trying
to Solve the “Pigs in a Pen” Problem (in the
Baseline and Training Conditions)
As part of this study, we also examined the drawings done by
the participants in their search for a solution to the “pigs in a
pen” problem (randomly chosen out of the seven presented). We
studied whether and how the training and baseline conditions
differed in terms of the set of spatial properties explored
in the drawings (Section The space relating to the problem:
relevant and non-relevant properties) and whether both poles
of a dimension were considered (Section The search space
in terms of dimensions). We also assessed the degree of
changeability/fixedness of the properties considered in each of
the attempts (Section Degree of changeability/fixedness of the
properties considered in each of the attempts). These analyses
were meant to help explain how the training had modified the
procedures followed by problem solvers in the search phase.
We acknowledge the limits of an analysis conducted on only
one of the seven problems. However, analyses of a single
problem are not uncommon in insight-problem solving studies
(e.g., Grant and Spivey, 2003; Kershaw et al., 2013; Öllinger
et al., 2013, 2014). Moreover, the results which emerged from
this analysis were not meant to be conclusive, our intention
was merely to offer some further indications on how training
might have modified the direction which the participants’
search took.
Two independent judges analyzed 313 drawings and
determined which spatial properties were displayed in each
drawing using an ad hoc classification grid made up of 42 pairs
of opposite spatial properties, i.e., 84 properties in total (e.g.,
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FIGURE 1 | Fixed effect plot of the interaction between the Training
condition (baseline, training) and the Participation condition (group,
individual) on the success rate (logit-scale). The bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
FIGURE 2 | Fixed effect plot of the main effect of the Training condition
(training, baseline) on the time taken to find the solution
(seconds-scale). The bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
symmetrical-asymmetrical, angular-rounded, left-right, dense-
sparse; see Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material). The grid
was an adaptation of a list of 37 basic dimensions characterizing
direct experiences of space (Bianchi et al., 2011b) in terms of
FIGURE 3 | Fixed effect plot of the main effect of the Participation
condition on the average number of attempts, i.e., drawings made
during the search for a solution (log-scale). The bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
extension, shape, localization and orientation. The degree of
inter-rater agreement reached by the two independent judges
turned out to be very high (K di Cohen= 0.85).
The Space Relating to the Problem: Relevant and
Non-relevant Properties
The task in the “pigs in a pen” problem is to add two more
square pens so as to ensure that each pig ends up in a pen of its
own. The square pen shown in the initial figure is represented
in its typical orientation, i.e., a square with two horizontal sides
and two vertical sides (Figure 4, diagram on the left). By adding
two differently oriented, progressively smaller squares inside the
original pen, the solution can be found (Figure 4, diagram on
the right). In terms of the classification grid used in this study,
37 of the 84 spatial properties listed are relevant (as indicated
in Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material). We created a new
independent variable (Relevance, with two levels: relevant, non-
relevant) and analyzed the drawings done by the participants
in the two Training conditions in terms of use or non-use (a
dichotomous dependent variable) of the various relevant and
non-relevant properties.
A GLMMwas conducted on the Use of the 84 properties made
by the groups in the baseline and training conditions (binomial
family, with Training condition and Relevance as fixed effects,
Group and Property as random effects). The analysis revealed
a main effect of Relevance [χ2(1, N = 40) = 108.173, p < 0.0001],
i.e., relevant properties were used more frequently than non-
relevant properties, but it also revealed a significant interaction
between the Training condition and Relevance [χ2(1, N = 40) =
64.725, p < 0.0001; see Figure 5]. Post-hoc tests clearly showed
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FIGURE 4 | On the left: the initial figure showing the “pigs in a pen”
problem, with nine pigs enclosed within a square pen. On the right: the
solution.
FIGURE 5 | Fixed effect plot of the interaction between the Training
condition (training, baseline) and the Relevance of the properties
(relevant, non-relevant) with regard to the probability of them being
used (logit-scale). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
that relevant properties were more likely to appear in the
drawings produced by the participants exposed to training as
compared to the baseline condition (EST = 0.371, SE = 0.142;
z ratio = 2.602, p < 0.05), whereas no significant difference was
found for non-relevant properties (EST = 0.201, SE = 0.141; z
ratio= 1.423, p= 0.928).
The Search Space in Terms of Dimensions
In the training session, it was explicitly suggested that in the
search phase participants should consider not only the properties
pertaining to the initial representation of the problem but also
their contraries. Therefore, we expected participants exposed
to training to more frequently use both of the two opposite
properties in their drawings, i.e., both of the two poles forming
a dimension (e.g., large and small, inside and outside) than the
participants in the baseline condition.
We defined a new variable (Dimension Use) on 4 levels:
Dimension Within Attempt (DWA), i.e., both properties were
used within the same drawing (e.g., a straight sided square pig
pen and an obliquely oriented pig pen); Dimension Between
Attempts (DBA), i.e., a property was used in one drawing and
the opposite property was used in another drawing (e.g., one
drawing exclusively showed straight sided square pig pens and
another drawing displayed an oblique pig pen); Pole (P), i.e.,
participants never referred to a whole dimension in any of their
drawings (e.g., they drew only straight sided pens and never
changed the orientation of the pen); None (N), i.e., neither of
the two poles were used in any of the drawings. Since in some
cases both contrary properties were relevant to the solution, in
other cases only one of the two properties was relevant and
in yet other cases neither of the two properties was relevant,
the analyses were made taking into account the Relevance of
the dimension on the three levels mentioned earlier (relevant,
partially relevant, non-relevant). For each of the 42 dimensions
forming the classification grid, we calculated how frequently (in
proportion to the total number of drawings done) the dimension
was used in one of the four modalities (DWA, DBA, N, P).
We then conducted a GLMM on this data (binomial family,
with Training Condition, Relevance and Dimension Use as fixed
effects and Dimensions and Groups as random effects).
The interaction between the Training condition and
Dimension Use turned out to be significant [χ2(3, N = 40) =
39.784, p < 0.0001]. Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that the
drawings done in the two Training conditions did not differ
either in terms of the probability of the whole dimension being
used within the same drawing (DWA, EST = 0.077, SE = 0.043,
z ratio = 1.774, p = 1.000) or in terms of a dimension never
being used (N, EST =−0.083, SE = 0.048, z ratio=−1.699, p=
1.000). The differences we found concerned the use of only one
of the two poles of a dimension (P) and the use of one dimension
divided between attempts (DBA). Participants more frequently
used only one pole (P) in the baseline condition as compared
to the training condition (EST = 0.383, SE = 0.094, z ratio =
4.052, p= 0.001). This is in line with our prediction that training
would prompt the exploration of both poles of a dimension. The
use of one dimension divided between two attempts (DBA) also
turned out to be more probable in the baseline as compared to
the training condition (EST = 0.291, SE= 0.051, z ratio= 5.664,
p < 0.0001). This is apparently in contrast with our predictions,
but a significant interaction between the Training condition,
Dimension Use and Relevance [χ2(6, N = 40) = 104.871, p <
0.0001; see Figure 6] and corresponding post-hoc tests revealed
that this held specifically for dimensions which were not relevant
to the solution (EST = 0.621, SE = 0.118, z ratio = 5.226, p
< 0.0001). No significant differences were found between the
training and baseline conditions with regard to the relevant
dimensions (EST = −0.124, SE = 0.079, z ratio = −1.569, p =
1.000) or the partially relevant dimensions (EST =−0.129, SE =
0.058, z ratio=−2.204, p= 1.000).
Post-hoc test also revealed that the training had reduced the
use of only one pole (P) specifically for the Relevant dimensions
(EST = 2.153, SE = 0.401, z ratio = 5.362, p < 0.0001). No
significant differences were found between the training and
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FIGURE 6 | Fixed effect plot of the interaction between the Training
condition, Relevance of the properties, and Dimension use on the
probability of a dimension being used (logit-scale). Dimension use is
defined on 4 levels: Dimension displayed Within the same Attempt (DWA),
Dimension displayed Between Attempts (DBA), only one Pole of a dimension
used (P) and Neither of the poles used (N). Bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
baseline conditions with regard to the irrelevant dimensions (EST
= 0.018, SE = 0.347, z ratio = 0.054, p = 1.000) or the partially
relevant dimensions (EST = 0.177, SE = 0.324, z ratio= 0.547, p
= 1.000).
Degree of Changeability/Fixedness of the Properties
Considered in Each of the Attempts
The changeability/fixedness of a property in the search space
considered by participants was expressed in terms of the number
of drawings done which displayed the property in question, as a
proportion of the total number of drawings done by that group.
The greater the proportional value, the greater the degree of
fixedness, e.g., a value of 1 would indicate that the property
was used in all of the drawings done by a particular group,
representing maximum fixedness. A GLMM was conducted on
the values of changeability/fixedness for each property (binomial
family, with Training condition and Relevance as fixed effects,
Group and Property as random effects). A significant main
effect of Relevance emerged [χ2(1, N = 40) = 68.268, p < 0.0001]:
relevant properties were kept fixed more frequently across
attempts than non-relevant properties. However, a significant
interaction between Relevance and the Training condition also
emerged [χ2(1, N = 40) = 26.099, p < 0.0001; see Figure 7]. Post-
hoc tests revealed that the groups exposed to training did not
differ from those in the baseline condition in terms of their
aptitude toward changing relevant properties (EST = 0.092, SE
FIGURE 7 | Fixed effect plot of the interaction between the Training
condition (training, baseline) and Relevance of the properties (relevant,
non-relevant) on the probability of their fixedness (logit-scale). Bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
= 0.047, z ratio = 1.933, p = 0.319). Conversely, non-relevant
properties were less fixed (in other words more changeable)
across attempts in the training condition than in the baseline
condition (EST = −0.178, SE = 0.058, z ratio = −3.081,
p < 0.01).
The Search Space in Terms of Dimensions
Manipulated in the Drawings Done by the
Participants in the Individual Condition
When Trying to Solve the “Pigs in a Pen”
Problem (in the Baseline and Training
Conditions)
In order to help us explain why the effects of the training
had emerged in the group condition but not in the individual
condition, we explored whether the drawings made by individual
participants while solving the “pigs in a pen” problemmanifested
similar trends to those found with the groups. In particular,
we explored whether participants exposed to the training made
use of only one pole of the dimension (P) less frequently than
the participants in the baseline condition, or use of both of the
two opposite properties more frequently in their drawings (i.e.,
Dimension Within Attempt, DWA, and/or Dimension Between
Attempts, DBA). This might be considered a clue that they
succeeded in applying the training, even though this did not lead
to a higher solution rate—it is clear from literature on the subject
that the effects of training are not necessarily manifested by better
success rates (e.g., Patrick and Ahmed, 2014; Patrick et al., 2015).
When analysing the results of the groups, for each of the
42 dimensions forming the classification grid we calculated
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how frequently (in proportion to the total number of drawings
done) the dimension was used in one of the four modalities
(DWA, DBA, N, and P). We then conducted a GLMM on this
data (binomial family, with Training Condition, Relevance and
Dimension Use as fixed effects and Dimensions and Individuals
as random effects). The interaction between the Training
condition and Dimension Use turned out to be significant
[χ2(3, N = 136) = 16.1313, p = 0.001]. Bonferroni post-hoc tests
revealed that the drawings done in the baseline and training
conditions did not differ either in terms of the probability of the
whole dimension being used within the same drawing (DWA,
EST = −0.071, SE = 0.060, z ratio = −1.193, p = 1.000) or
between drawings (DBA, EST = 0.102, SE = 0.074, z ratio =
1.380, p = 1.000), nor did they differ in terms of a dimension
never being used (N, EST = −0.134, SE = 0.069, z ratio =
−1.939, p = 1.000). The differences concerned the use of only
one of the two poles of a dimension (P): similarly to the results
found for the groups, individual participants more frequently
used only one pole in the baseline condition as compared to the
training condition (EST = 0.388, SE = 0.083, z ratio = 4.654,
p < 0.0001). The significant interaction between the Training
condition, Dimension Use and Relevance [χ2(6, N = 136) = 48.940,
p < 0.0001], and corresponding post-hoc tests, revealed that
this held specifically for dimensions which were relevant to the
solution (EST = 1.045, SE = 0.183, z ratio = 5.691, p < 0.0001).
No significant differences were found between the training
and baseline conditions with regard to the other categories
of responses (DBA, DWA, and N). Therefore, in both the
group and individual conditions, the training led to a reduction
in the partial explorations of the solution space in terms of
relevant properties (i.e., those limited to only one property, P). A
second GLMM was conducted to compare the two participation
conditions (with Participation condition, Training Condition,
Relevance and Dimension Use as fixed effects and Dimensions
and Groups as random effects). A significant interaction between
Participation Condition, Training condition and Dimension Use
emerged [here are the Chi square values: χ2(3, N = 136) = 32.7819,
p < 0.0001]. The use of only one pole (P) was significantly less
frequent when participants exposed to the training solved the
problems in groups as compared to when they did it individually
(EST = 0.448, SE= 0.109, z ratio= 4.108, p < 0.005).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The study presented in this paper aimed to further
explore the hypothesis that reasoning in terms of
contrast/contrariety/opposition might facilitate problem
solving. Our results from the explicit guidance condition add
to the previous literature based on implicit guidance which
we mentioned in the introduction (e.g., Gale and Ball, 2012;
Branchini et al., 2015a). The participants in our study were
exposed to a brief training session in which it was suggested
that they approach the task by systematically transforming the
spatial features of a problem into their contraries. Examples were
provided in order to demonstrate how this strategy might help
to guide the participants’ exploration of new representations
throughout the solution search phase. Participants were then
asked to transfer the strategy they had learned to seven other
problems.
Four main findings emerged from the analyses. First, in terms
of success rates (i.e., the number of problems which participants
were able to find a solution to), the groups exposed to training
performed better than the individuals. Exposure to training
did not lead to an increase in the number of attempts made
(i.e., the number of drawings). Our in-depth analysis of the
characteristics of the drawings the participants had completed
when trying to solve the “pigs in a pen” problem revealed
that the search space which they had concentrated on did
not in general expand, but they focused more on properties
which were relevant to the solution, while at the same time
the properties that they had examined and were non relevant
to the solution were more readily disregarded in subsequent
drawings. Moreover, the participants exposed to training made
fewer “incomplete” explorations of the possible manipulations of
the relevant properties related to the structure of the problem by
limiting their explorations to only one pole. This last finding,
in particular, was tested and verified in both the group and
individual participation conditions.
In conclusion, our in-depth analysis of the effects of training in
the case of the “pigs in a pen” problem suggests that in the group
condition the training expanded the search space in a focused
way, i.e., it did not lead to a disorientedmultiplication of attempts
and participants kept close to the properties which were relevant
to the problem (on the relationship between “antonymous
reasoning” and originality of solutions, rather than fluency, see
also Dumas et al., 2016).We interpret this focused process (which
is in line with Öllinger et al., 2013, but also Gale and Ball, 2012)
as a consequence of the element of continuity that is implied in
the idea of contrariety, as we pointed out in the introduction. In
terms of continuity versus discontinuity in reasoning processes
activated by thinking in terms of opposites, our results support
discontinuity as the participants in the training condition were
more likely to investigate various different paths (i.e., they less
frequently limited their transformation to only one pole of the
spatial dimensions they explored) each time discarding non
relevant properties. They also kept more relevant properties fixed
across the attempts and here too continuity is implied. Further
investigations are needed in order to ascertain the extent to which
these last results (which are based on an in-depth exploration
of only one problem) can be generalized. What emerged is,
however, in agreement with studies that suggest that the search
phase of problem solving is evolutionary in nature with several
search processes being launched simultaneously and their results
being tested against a criterion of success which is defined by
the structure of the problem. The most promising candidates are
copied and modified until a solution is found or a dead-end is
reached (Fernando et al., 2010; Dietrich and Haider, 2015).
The training we exposed participants to was not specific to
a given problem (as in, for example, Chronicle et al., 2001,
Experiment 3; Weisberg and Alba, 1981; Grant and Spivey, 2003;
Kershaw and Ohlsson, 2004; Kershaw et al., 2013; Öllinger et al.,
2013, 2014) but rather provided advice on how to search for
a solution to a set of (spatial) problems and in this sense it
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resembles meta-cognitive training. However, it differs from other
types of domain-specific meta-cognitive training investigated
in previous literature (some of which is domain specific, e.g.,
Walinga et al., 2011; Patrick and Ahmed, 2014; Patrick et al.,
2015) in that the participants in the present study were asked
to use the “oppositional reasoning” strategy they had been told
about in their exploration of the spatial domain. For both of these
reasons it can be said to represent yet another method to add to
the types of training whose facilitating effects on insight problem
solving have been tested. It should be clear from the experimental
design adopted in our study (with the control condition being
no training and not another type of training) that the goal of
the study was not to verify whether prompting participants to
think in terms of opposites is more effective as compared to
other types of training. Our goal was to collect evidence of
whether explicitly showing participants how thinking in terms
of contraries supports representational change leads to a better
result than leaving them to work on their own. We wanted to
ascertain whether this type of advice is useful and in fact the
results of our study were positive.
As stated in the introduction, the study presented in this
paper represents a conceptual development of a previous study
in which contraries were used as an unaware, implicit strategy
(Branchini et al., 2015a). A comparison between the effects of
providing contraries as an implicit versus explicit guidance might
tell us something more about how this heuristic impacts on the
solution process. It would also be interesting to explore new
ways of stimulating both implicit processing (e.g., using dynamic
visual tasks) and explicit processing (e.g., using different types of
training). In terms of the current state of the art situation, only a
provisional comparison can be made between the improvement
due to prompting participants to use contraries in implicit and
explicit guidance conditions based on the findings from the
present study and that carried out by Branchini et al. (2015a).
There are obvious limits when one compares two experiments
which do not perfectly coincide in terms of their experimental
design. The problems used in Branchini et al. (2015a) were of a
similar type to those used in the present study but only two were
exactly the same; moreover, in the previous study the participants
had no time limits whereas in the present study they were given
seven and a half minutes. These differences are reflected in the
percentage of correct responses in the baseline conditions in the
two studies: 32% in the present study versus 67% in Branchini
et al. (2015a). However, if we compare the improvement in
the success rates associated with the experimental conditions in
both of the studies, a similar effect emerges. Providing implicit
guidance (as in Branchini et al., 2015a) led to 79% of correct
solutions, which means an increment of 12% with respect to the
corresponding baseline. Providing explicit guidance (as in the
present study) led to 42% of correct solutions, which means an
increment of 10%with respect to the corresponding baseline. The
similarity between these two increments is thought-provoking. It
might indicate that aware or unaware processing of contraries led
to similar results or, alternatively, it might indicate that it was not
the explanation given to participants about which mechanism to
apply that was relevant in the training condition. The participants
were asked to look for contraries before embarking in the
solution process (and this is exactly the same as in the implicit
guidance condition in the study done by Branchini et al., 2015a),
and this, rather than the training as a whole, might have implicitly
stimulated the expansion of the search space and the relaxation
of the constraints relating to the mental representation of the
problems.
A further question raised by the findings of the experiment
presented in this paper concerns why training had positive
effects specifically in the group condition. Participants worked in
small groups also in the previous study where a positive effect
of an implicit prompt to use opposites was found (Branchini
et al., 2015a). The fact that groups work more effectively than
individuals in problem solving also emerged in Augustinova’s
study (2008) on the benefits of falsification cueing in Wason’s
selection task, and in Laughlin et al.’s studies on letters-to-
numbers problems (Laughlin et al., 2002, 2003). Attention has
been devoted to how groups process information and a key factor
seems to be the high degree of social sharedness of information
at group level (e.g., Larson and Christensen, 1993; Wittenbaum
and Stasser, 1996; Tindale and Kameda, 2000; Tindale et al., 2001;
Galinsky and Kray, 2004). In order to help us to explain why,
in our study, the training specifically affected success rates in
the performance of the groups, but not in the performance of
the individuals, we explored the dimensions manipulated in the
drawings made by participants in the individual condition and
matched them to those made by the groups [Section The search
space in terms of dimensions manipulated in the drawings done
by the participants in the individual condition when trying to
solve the “pigs in a pen” problem (in the baseline and training
conditions)]. We found that—similarly to what happened in
groups—also in the individual condition, participants exposed
to the training limited their explorations of the properties
relevant to the solution to only one pole (P) less frequently than
individuals in the baseline condition. Therefore, at least for the
“pigs in a pen problem,” the training seems to have a similar
effect in both the individual and group conditions. It was simply
stronger in the latter case. Moreover, when they were in groups,
the participants made more attempts than when participating
individually (Section Number of attempts, i.e., the number of
drawings done). These two results taken together suggest that
the difference in success rates between individuals and groups
might actually lay in the fact that individuals made fewer solving
attempts than groups (although in the right direction), rather
than in the fact that the attempts made to apply what they had
learned were less effective.
Three further considerations on the effects of “thinking in
opposites” in group can however be put forward. Firstly, the
general hypothesis underlying our training is that referring
to contraries helps people to deal with the complexity of the
problem structure by showing them “what is in there,” not only
in terms of actual properties but also in terms of their potential
variations. The observation that every variation occurs within
the framework of contraries is not only an intuition that we are
indebted to Aristotle for (ed. Aristotle, 1984, Cat. 5, 4a 30-34). It is
a principle that models the human direct experience of space (as
pointed out by Savardi and Bianchi, 2009; Bianchi et al., 2011b)
and also goes well beyond that, as testified by the pervasiveness
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of antonyms in every natural language (e.g., Jones, 2002; Murphy,
2003; Paradis et al., 2013). The training session in our study aimed
to prompt divergent thinking and the creation of alternative
representations by suggesting changes to the structure of the
problemwhich were radical but at the same time also anchored to
it. Working in groups might have facilitated this process since it
has been demonstrated that the information which is more likely
to be brought up in the discussion and more likely to influence
decisions made is that which is shared by all groupmembers (e.g.,
Wittenbaum and Stasser, 1996); the structure of the problem is
the information shared by everyone in the group.
Secondly, in the training session participants were advised, as
a first step, to identify all the spatial features characterizing the
configuration of the problem. The better the descriptive analyses
conducted in this initial phase were (in terms of exhaustiveness
and precision), the richer the list of constraints to be relaxed
in the following steps was when they transformed each feature
into its contrary. We know from research into the Psychology
of Perception that inter-observation in small groups of three to
four members leads to more accurate descriptions of the facts
under observation (see Bozzi, 1978; Bozzi and Martinuzzi, 1989;
Kubovy, 2002). Therefore, in our case working in small groups
might have improved the quality of the initial analysis of the
structure of the problem.
Lastly, our training consisted of prompting participants to
explore the structure of the problem in disconfirmatory rather
than confirmatory terms. Confirmation biases are more likely
to be prominent when people use their own problem solving
strategies in an individual condition. On the contrary, if people
in groups are asked to think in terms of opposites, not only do
they do so on an individual basis, they also apply this strategy to
suggestions coming from other members of the group. Moreover,
it has already been shown that in argumentative discourse the
ability to address opposing positions is crucial in order for people
to coordinate their own perspective to that of other people (Kuhn
and Udell, 2007) and that groups benefit more than individuals
from the use of falsification cueing in reasoning (Augustinova
et al., 2005; Augustinova, 2008). Whether these data, taken
together, are general evidence that small groups provide a better
context for “thinking in terms of opposites” is an intriguing
question, but as yet it is still premature for conclusions to be
drawn.
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